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Strickler v, Greene
119 S. Ct. 1936 (1999)
L Facts
On January 5, 1990, two men, later identified as Tommy David
Strickler ("Strickler") and Ronald Henderson ("Henderson"), abducted
nineteen-year-old Leanne Whitlock ("Whitlock") from the parking lot of
Valley Mall in Harrisonburg, Virginia. Eight days later, Whitlock's body
was discovered on a farm in Augusta County along with Henderson's wallet
and Caucasian hairs, three of which were likely Strickler's.' A jury in the
Augusta County Circuit Court convicted Strickler of robbery, abduction,
and capital murder for the death of Whitlock! The jury recommended a
death sentence.'
Anne Stoltzfus ("Stotzfus") was the only eyewitness to the abduction
to testify at trial. She testified that she twice encountered Strickler,
Henderson, and a blond woman in the Valley Mall on January 5, 1990, and
that she witnessed them abduct Whitlock in the parking lot. She first spoke
to police a week and a half after the incident. Stoltzfus claimed to remem-
ber the three because she had seen them first in a music store, where she
noticed Strickler's impatient demeanor, and later walking through the mall,
where the blond woman bumped-into her. She further testified that she had
"an exceptionally good memory." 4
Stoltzfus testified that she saw the three in the parking lot about forty-
five minutes after seeing them in the mall. She claimed that she witnessed
Strickler bang on the window of a blue Mercury Lynx driven by a woman
she later identified as Whitlock. Stoltzfus testified that Strickler then
jumped into Whitlock's car and, after a brief struggle, Henderson and the
blond woman got into the back seat of the car. She stated that she then
pulled her car parallel to the Mercury, got out and asked Whitlock if she
were okay. Whitlock mouthed something that Stoltzfus was unable to
comprehend. Nevertheless, Stoltzfus started to drive away. As she was
leaving, she realized that Whitlock had mouthed the word "help."' Stot-
1. Strickler v. Greene, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1942-46, 1954 & n.41 (1999). Strickler was
executed by lethal injection on July 21, 1999.
2. Id. at 1946.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1943-44.
5. Strickler v. Commonwealth, 404 S.E.2d 227, 230 (Va. 1991).
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zfus's daughter supposedly wrote down the license plate number of the
Mercury. Stoltzfus did not report the incident to police.6
Following his conviction, death sentence, and appeal to the Supreme
Court of Virginia, new counsel represented Strickler in state habeas corpus
proceedings. Strickler based his petition on an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, alleging in part that his trial counsel's failure to file a motion
under Brady v. Maryland invalidated his conviction.9 Strickler was denied
relief in the state proceedings."
Strickler then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern
District of Virginia." During discovery, the court entered an order granting
Strickler the right to examine and copy all of the police and prosecution files
in the case. 2 This order led to Strickler's discovery of the "Stoltzfus
materials." The "Stoltzfus materials" consisted of letters written by Stoltzfus
to Detective Danny Claytor ("Claytor") of the Harrisonburg Police Depart-
ment and Claytor's notes from an interview with Stotzfus." There are
eight exhibits in question. These materials were kept in the Harrisonburg
Police Department files. " There was a dispute between the parties as to
whether defense counsel saw three of the eight exhibits which the prosecu-
tor maintained were in his open file, available for inspection." The prosecu-
tor claimed that he never saw the other five exhibits until after the trial.
16
Lead defense counsel claimed he never saw the documents, and co-counsel
remembered the information contained in the materials, but could not recall
6. Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1943. This is not the only time that Stoltzfus has failed to
report information about a murder case to police. Thirty years ago, she claims to have heard
a woman scream as she was stabbed to death. She also claims that someone confessed to her
that he committed a murder. Stoltzfus did not call the police either time. Frank Green,
Pharmacist's Brushes With Murder Continue, Testimony at Issue in Slaying Appeal, RICHMOND
TIMES-DISPATCH, February 21, 1999, at Al.
7. Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1946.
8. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
9. Strickler, 119 S. Ct at 1946. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
10. Strickler, 119 S.Ct. at 1946; Strickler, 452 S.E.2d at 648.
11. Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1946.
12. Id. at 1947. The record does not discuss the factual basis on which the District
Court entered this order. The Supreme Court notes that it is not dear that Strickler was
entitled to such discovery. Id. at 1951 & n.28.
13. Id. at 1944.
14. Strickler v. Pruett, Nos. 97-29, 97-30, 1998 WL 340420, at *7 (4th Cir. June 17,
1998). This is an unpublished opinion which is referenced in the "Table of Decisions
Without Reported Opinions" at 149 F.3d 1170 (4th Cir. 1998).
15. Id. Prosecutor Lee Ervin stated that exhibits two, seven and eight were disclosed
to the defense pursuant to his open file policy. A subpoena issued by the federal district court
revealed that these exhibits were in the custody of the Augusta County Commonwealth's
Attorney's office. At trial, Strickler did not request to examine the police files. Id.
16. Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1945.
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seeing the documents. The "Stoltzfus materials" cast grave doubt on
Stotzfus's vivid trial testimony."7 Based on the discovery of that evidence,
Strickler raised a direct claim that his conviction was invalid because the
prosecution had failed to provide him with this evidence as required under
Brady.'
8
The five exhibits, which the parties agreed were not in the prosecutor's
file, consisted of three letters from Stoltzfus to Claytor, Claytor's notes after
his first interview with Stoltzfus, and an exhibit entitled "observations,"
which included a summary of the abduction. The documents disclose that
Stoltzfus initially did not recall being at the mall and that she had a "very
vague memory" of the abduction. 9 Additionally, Claytor's notes revealed
that Stoltzfus initially could not identify Strickler, Henderson, or Whitlock
from a photo lineup. Further, exhibit six revealed that Stoltzfus visited
Whitlock's boyfriend and looked at current photos of Whitlock. Her trial
testimony made no mention of that meeting.2"
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted Strick-
ler's motion for summary judgment on his Brady claim.2' The court found
that the failure to disclose these five documents was sufficiently prejudicial
to undermine confidence in the jury's verdict. Further, the court found
that, although Strickler had procedurally defaulted the Brady claim because
he had not raised it earlier, he demonstrated cause to excuse the default.22
The court issued a writ of habeas corpus and dismissed Strickler's claim
concerning proportionality review of his death sentence.23
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that Strickler's Brady and propor-
tionality claims were procedurally defaulted because the factual bases for
them were available at the time Strickler filed his state habeas petition.24
Further, the court held that Strickler failed to show cause to excuse the
default.2" Finally, the court stated that the claim would fail on the merits
even if it were not defaulted because Strickler had not shown prejudice. 26
17. Id. at 1944.
18. Id. at 1947.
19. Id. at 1944-45.
20. Id. Stoltzfus learned of Whitlock's boyfriend through a newspaper story. She
claims that she went to visit him because she had "to see pictures of Leanne. The picture in
the newspaper did not look like the black girl that I saw." After viewing the photos, she
claims to have been certain of her identification of Whitlock. Green, supra note 6, at Al.
21. Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1947.
22. Id. Defense counsel had no independent access to these materials and the Common-
wealth withheld the evidence during state habeas proceedings. Id.
23. Id.
24. Strickler, 1998 WL 340420, at *8.
25. Id., at *9.
26. Id. See Douglas R. Banghart, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 145 (1998) (analyzing
Strickler v. Pruett, Nos. 97-29, 97-30, 1998 WL 340420 (4th Cir. June 17, 1998)).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine (1) whether the state
violated Brady and its progeny, (2) whether defense established the requisite
cause for the failure to raise the claim in state court, and (3) if there were
acceptable cause, whether Strickler suffered prejudice sufficient to excuse the
procedural default.27
II. Holding
The United States Supreme Court held that (1) the "Stoltzfus materials"
were favorable to Strickler for purposes of Brady, (2) Strickler established
cause for the procedural default in raising the Brady claim because he reason-
ably relied on the open file policy of the prosecutor, but (3) Strickler could
show neither materiality under Brady nor prejudice that would excuse his
procedural default.2" The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's
denial of relief.29
II. Analysis /Application in Virginia
A. The Brady Rule
The Supreme Court began its analysis of Strickler's claim by noting
"there is never a real Brady violation unless the non-disclosure was so serious
that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would
have produced a different result."' The Court framed the Brady inquiry to
include the following three elements: (1) the evidence must be favorable to
the defendant; (2) the State must have suppressed it; and (3) prejudice31 must
have resulted.32 The Court found that the first two elements were "unques-
tionably established." 3
27. Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1941.
28. Id. at 1937.
29. id.
30. Id. at 1948 (citing standard for materiality set forth in United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667 (1985)).
31. Prior to this decision, the third prong of a Brady violation required petitioner to
show "materiality," not 'prejudice." See infra Part M.B.3.
32. Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1948. Brady held that "suppression of evidence favorable to
an accused upon request violates due process where that evidence is material to guilt or to
punishment." 373 U.S. at 87. See also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (holding
that this duty to disclose extends to impeachment evidence). Moreover, in Kyles v. Whitley,
514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995), the Court determined that the prosecution has an affirmative duty
to learn of any favorable information known by anyone acting on the government's behalf.
33. Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1948.
[Vol. 1 2:1
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B. The Brady Analysis
1. Evidence Favorable to Strickler (Brady Prong #1)
The Court found the evidence was favorable to Strickler because of the
impeaching character of the suppressed materials.34 The vivid testimony
that Stoltzfus offered at trial, when contrasted with her initial impressions
(or lack thereof) of the abduction, readily established this component of the
claim."
2. Evidence Suppressed by the State and Cause to Excuse the Procedural De-
fault of the Brady Claim (Brady Prong #2, Procedural Default Prong #1)
The second prong of the Brady claim was also easily met. Strickler
established the requisite cause because there was no dispute about the fact
that the "Stoltzfus materials" were known to the Commonwealth, but not
disclosed to his counsel.36 In finding that Strickler established the requisite
cause, the Court relied on a combination of the following three factors: (1)
exculpatory evidence was withheld; (2) Strickler reasonably relied on the
prosecution's "open file" policy as fulfilling the Brady obligation to disclose
such material; and (3) the Commonwealth confirmed Strickler's reliance on
the file during state habeas proceedings."
. The Court found fault with the reasoning employed by the Fourth
Circuit in its determination that Strickler did not establish cause to excuse
the procedural default. 8 The Fourth Circuit held that the factual basis for
the Brady claim was available during state habeas proceedings because
defense counsel knew that Stoltzfus had been interviewed by Harrisonburg
police. 9 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that Strickler should have sought
discovery of those files.' The Supreme Court found this reasoning illogical.
34. Id. The Court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that the materials did not
come under the reach of Brady because they were inculpatory. The Court noted that Brady
disclosure extends to materials that may be used to impeach a witness. Id. n.21 (citing Bagley,
473 U.S. at 676).
35. Id. at 1948-49.
36. Id. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (noting that the Brady rule extends to evidence known
only to the police and not to the prosecution).
37. Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1952. In the state habeas proceedings, the Commonwealth
maintained that Strickler was given full disclosure of everything known to the government.
Id. at 1949 & n. 14. The Court further noted that "if a prosecutor asserts that he complies
with Brady through an open file policy, defense counsel may reasonably rely on that file to
contain all materials the State is constitutionally obligated to disclose under Brady." Id. at
1952 & n.23.
38. Id. at n. 18. "For reasons we do not entirely understand, the Court of Appeals thus
concluded that, while it was reasonable for trial counsel to rely on the open file policy, it was
unreasonable for postconviction counsel to do so." Id.




The Court noted that although counsel knew that Stoltzfus had been
interviewed, it did not follow that counsel knew interview notes existed and
had been suppressed.4 The Court also found that there was no evidence to
suggest that Strickler's failure to raise the claim in state court was a tactical
decision by defense counsel.42
Defense counsel should note that the broad discovery order granted by
the district court in this case is not guaranteed to a petitioner under state
law.4" Not only would Strickler have been unable to procure this discovery
in state habeas proceedings, but under Rule 3A: 11 of the Virginia Supreme
Court Rules Strickler was not entitled to these materials (except as modified
by Brady) at trial." The Court noted that it is not even clear that Strickler
had a right to this discovery in federal habeas proceedings.4" This situation
creates a serious problem for defense counsel who have only a suspicion that
exculpatory materials exist. Counsel should note the need to federalize any
objection to lack of discovery.
3. Materiality/Prejudice under Brady and Prejudice to Excuse Procedural
Default (Brady Prong #3, Procedural Default Prong #2)
A. Background
Historically, after the Court found cause to excuse procedural default
of a Brady claim, the next question would have been whether prejudice
ensued.' In this case, however, the Court merged the prejudice analysis
41. Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1950.
42. Id. at 1952. "There is no suggestion that tactical considerations played any role in
petitioner's failure to raise his Brady claim in state court." Id. See Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S.
214, 222 (1988) (stating that "if concealment rather than tactical considerations, was the
reason for the failure... then petitioner has established ample cause to excuse procedural
default").
43. Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1950. Under Virginia law, Strickler would not have been
entitled to this broad discovery in state habeas proceedings absent a showing of good cause.
Id. The Court noted that mere speculation is not likely to satisfy this requirement. Id. at
1950-51.
44. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A: 11. This rule excludes from defendants much of the Common-
wealth's investigation material, including statements made by Commonwealth witnesses to
agents of the Commonwealth. Section (b)(2) of the rule states in part that it "does not
authorize the discovery or inspection of statements made by Commonwealth witnesses or
prospective Commonwealth witnesses to agents of the Commonwealth." Furthermore,
Virginia law limits discovery available during state habeas proceedings. See VA. SUP. CT. R.
4:1 (b)(5)(3)(b).
45. Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1951 nn.28 & 29. Under Rule 4:1 (b)(5)(3)(b) the state court
may deny or limit discovery in any proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus. VA. SUP. CT. R.
4:1 (b)(5)(3)(b).
46. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) ("[W]e now make it
explicit: In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court
pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the
[Vol. 12:1
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with the materiality determination under Brady. The Court considered
both claims at the same time, using the same evidence and apparently the
same standards. The framework of the analysis in this case is a departure
from the traditional analysis of a Brady claim.
Before Strickler, the tests for materiality and prejudice were different in
theory if not practice. In Bagley, the Court held that evidence is material "if
there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different."47 In Kyles
v. Whitley, the Court noted that under Bagley the question is, "not whether
the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict
with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial."4 The
Kyles Court stated that a fair trial is one that results in "a verdict worthy of
confidence."49
Conversely, the Court's formulation of the prejudice test used to
establish cause to excuse procedural default has not been as clearly defined.
In Wainwright v. Sykes,' the Court expressly declined to define the preju-
dice standard, noting only that it is more narrow than a standard "which
would make federal habeas review generally available to state convicts
absent a knowing and deliberate waiver of the federal constitutional con-
tention."51
B. Application
The Court noted that in order to obtain relief Strickler was required to
demonstrate that there was a "reasonable probability" that his conviction or
sentence would have been different if the "Stoltzfus materials" had been
disclosed. 2 This standard proved impossible to meet. The high standard set
by the Court again emphasizes the necessity of obtaining exculpatory
materials prior to trial.
Though the Court recognized that Stotzfus's testimony was prejudi-
cial, it found that the record strongly supported the conclusion that the
outcome of Strickler's case would have been the same even if her testimony
claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice
as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the
claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.").
47. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
48. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).
49. Id.
50. 432 U.S. 72 (1977).
51. Wainwright v. Sykes, 432 U.S. 72, 87 (1977). See also United States v. Frady, 456
U.S. 152, 167 (1982) (stating that proper standard of review for a procedurally defaulted
motion is 'cause and actual prejudice"); United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d. 888 (4th Cir.
1994) (citing "actual prejudice" standard employed in Frady).
52. Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1955.
1999]
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had been impeached."3 In so doing, it relied upon the testimony of other
witnesses at trial and reasoned that their testimony was sufficient to establish
that Strickler participated in the murder.' Furthermore, the Court recog-
nized that the capital murder charge was not dependent upon Strickler's
being the dominant partner.55
What the majority did not consider was the effect that Stoltzfus's
testimony had upon the jurors when they made their sentencing recommen-
dation. 6 In his dissent, Justice Souter pointed out that no other testimony
so clearly established Strickler as the dominant member of the trio which
abducted Whitlock.57 Justice Souter concluded that Stoltzfus's characteriza-
tion of Strickler as the leader might have influenced jurors in their assess-
ment of his future dangerousness.
5 1
The majority was not persuaded by this argument. The Court con-
cluded that Stoltzfus's testimony was not sufficiently related to Strickler's
eligibility for the death penalty since her testimony addressed neither the
"future dangerousness" nor the "vileness" predicate."s Moreover, the prose-
cution did not rely upon Stoltzfus's testimony during its closing argument
at the penalty phase of the trial.60 Accordingly, the Court dismissed Strick-
ler's claim that he suffered prejudice from the failure to disclose the evi-
dence.6'
C. Effect ofMerger
Materiality and prejudice determinations are both forms of harmless
error analysis. After this decision, in a Brady case the materiality determina-
tion is merged with the prejudice finding of procedural default. This merger
raises the question of whether either standard has been altered by this shift.
The effect of the shift may be to elevate the showing of prejudice in a
procedural default claim as the Court seems to be moving toward a unified
standard for all harmless error analyses.
53. Id. at 1954.
54. Id. at 1953-54.
55. Id. The judge instructed the jury that they could find Strickler guilty of capital
murder if the evidence established that he was a joint participant in the fatal beating. Id. The
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed this instruction on direct appeal. Id. at n.39. The joint
participation theory is a recognized exception to Virginia's "triggerman rule." See Coppola
v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 797,806 (Va. 1979); seealso VA CODE ANN. S 18.2-18 (Michie
1999).
56. See Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1958 (Souter, J., dissenting) (rejecting the Court's assess-
ment of the significance that jurors likely attached to Stoltzfus's testimony).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1960.






Although the United States Supreme Court ultimately denied relief in
this case, there are a number of important points to recognize. One is the
relative ease with which the Court found that the first two prongs of Brady
were satisfied. Another is that-both Bagley and Kyles were reaffirmed with
vigor on all points except the materiality determination. Conversely, the
failure to find that Stoltzfus's testimony was material under Brady is trou-
bling. This holding reaffirms that it is essential to obtain exculpatory or
impeaching evidence prior to trial, as the materiality determination at the
appellate level is rarely favorable to defendant. Furthermore, such a deter-
mination would not accurately reflect whether the evidence would have in
fact been material at both phases of the trial.
The problem of investigators withholding evidence, whether by acci-
dent or design, is serious and has been before the Court on at least two
occasions prior to this case.' One way defense counsel may be able to
obtain exculpatory materials pre-trial is through a motion to examine law
enforcement officials under oath in order to determine whether exculpatory
evidence exists that has not been disclosed to the Commonwealth.63 This
motion is available from the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse.
Ashley Flynn
62. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
419 (1995).
63. See Strickler, 1998 WL 340420, at *8 (stating "reasonably competent counsel would
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